The …nancial market gives signi…cant consideration to supply chain activities of publiclylisted …rms, who could in turn use their investments in the supply chain to manage market expectations. We study the e¤ects of the capital market concerns of a publiclytraded retailer that collaborates with a privately-owned supplier in a supply chain. The …rms each undertake a relation-speci…c investment and then bargain over the joint surplus generated by the collaboration. The retailer's market concerns make it a more aggressive bargainer, and able to obtain a higher share of the joint surplus. The investments of both …rms increase with the retailer's market concerns when the retailer's investment is su¢ ciently important for the collaboration. In this case, the retailer bene…ts from its market concerns. When the supplier's investment is su¢ ciently important, both …rms invest less and the retailer su¤ers from its market concerns. From the perspective of the whole supply chain, the retailer's market concerns could mitigate or exacerbate the hold-up problem between the two …rms and thus could be either bene…cial or detrimental. In the extension, we also discuss the observability of the …rms'investment decisions as well as the case of two symmetric …rms that are both publicly traded.
Introduction
Supply chain activities are an important part of the …rm value. The …nancial market gives signi…cant consideration to supply chain activities of publicly-listed …rms. 1 In this paper, we examine how a public …rm within a supply chain manages its stock market expectations through relation-speci…c investments that increase the value of the supply chain. Speci…cally, we study a supply chain setting where at least one participating …rm is publicly traded and faces pressure from the capital market. We are particularly interested in how this concern for stock price a¤ects the speci…c investment decisions of the focal …rm(s), as well as the subsequent e¤ects on the pro…tability of the individual …rms and the e¢ ciency of the whole supply chain.
It is well known that publicly-traded companies care about their stock performance. In a single …rm setting, this concern for capital market could lead the …rms to take actions that temporarily in ‡ate market belief but at the expense of the …rms'long-term value (Stein 1989 ). While we also apply a signal jamming model to explore the potential e¤ects of a …rm's market concerns, we focus on a supply chain with two …rms interacting with each other. Our paper complements the insight of prior literature by showing that one …rm's capital market concerns a¤ect not only its own investment decision and e¢ ciency, but also those of its business partner and the whole supply chain. We identify conditions when these e¤ects from market concerns are positive or negative, and show that, under plausible circumstances, market concerns could bene…t the individual …rms as well as the whole supply chain.
In the baseline model, we consider a supply chain consisting of a publicly-listed retailer and a privately-owned supplier. The game lasts two periods, with both …rms liquidated at the end of the second period. The supply chain collaboration between the two …rms comprises a signi…cant part of their respective businesses. At the beginning of the collaboration, each …rm must undertake a relationship-speci…c investment. The technology of the supply chain collaboration follows a Cobb-Douglas function, with the two …rms' investments serving as the two production inputs. The output elasticities represent the importance of the respective investment for the collaborative relationship. The investments and the associated costs are unobservable and unveri…able to outsiders including the capital market. The …rms then engage in trade and negotiate about the share of the joint surplus that each …rm receives.
An interim stock price is formed for the retailer at the end of the …rst period, based on the capital market's expectation of the retailer's long-term cash ‡ow. Due to its myopic concern for stock price, the retailer has an incentive to in ‡ate the market expectation of its future performance. We analyze how the retailer's capital market concerns a¤ect the …rms' decisions and subsequent pro…tability.
We show that the retailer's market concerns make it a more aggressive bargainer during the negotiation process. This is intuitive, as the retailer now has a higher stake to negotiate for. Consequently, the retailer's share of trading surplus from the supply chain collaboration increases in its degree of market concerns, while the share of trading surplus for the supplier decreases in the retailer'market concerns. However, the retailer's concern for the stock market price do not necessarily render it to make a higher investment. Depending on the relative importance of the two …rms' investments in their joint business, the retailer's incentive to invest may increase or decrease. In particular, if the supplier's investment is su¢ ciently more important than the retailer's investment in the collaboration, the retailer with market concerns would make an investment lower than without market concerns. This result obtains because the retailer's aggressive bargaining leaves the supplier less incentivized to invest in the collaboration. Given that the supplier's investment is more critical for the collaboration, its dampened incentive is anticipated by the retailer who then also reduces its own investment due to the inherent complementarity between the two investments. In contrast, when the retailer's investment is su¢ ciently more important for the supply chain collaboration, the complementarity implies that the investments of both …rms increase in the retailer's market concerns.
The retailer's market concerns a¤ect both the total size and the allocation of the trading surplus generated by the supply chain. While the market concerns always help the retailer in securing a bigger share of the supply chain surplus, its e¤ect on the total size of the surplus can be both positive and negative, depending on the investment decisions of the two …rms. The market concerns lead to higher payo¤ for the retailer when its own investment is su¢ ciently more important than the supplier's investment. In this case, the retailer obtains a bigger piece of a larger pie as it bene…ts from both increased total surplus and a bigger share of that surplus. This result complements conventional wisdom from signal jamming models in a single-…rm setting that typically suggest myopic market concerns are detrimental by generating wasteful investments. The retailer's market concerns could also result in a lower payo¤ when the supplier's investment is signi…cantly more important than the retailer's.
Under such circumstances, the retailer still receives a higher share of the trade surplus but the total surplus is smaller due to the underinvestments. In this case, the retailer can be worse o¤ in the presence of market concerns.
From the perspective of the whole supply chain, a classical hold-up problem arises when the retailer does not face any market concerns. That is, both …rm underinvest as they each have to bear the full cost for the respective investment, but cannot receive the full bene…ts.
The e¤ect of the retailer's market concerns on the e¢ ciency of the whole supply chain depends on the relative importance of these investments. When the retailer's investment is su¢ ciently more important, the …rms make higher investments, which mitigates the hold-up problem and improves supply chain e¢ ciency. However, the retailer's market concerns cannot lead the …rms to make optimal investments at …rst-best level. Thus the supply chain e¢ ciency cannot be restored just through the market concerns alone. 2 The retailer's market concerns, however, are not always bene…cial. If the supplier's investment is su¢ ciently more important than the retailer's investment, the retailer's market concerns can also induce underinvestment and results in detrimental e¤ect for the whole supply chain.
We then examine the e¤ect of observability of the …rms'investments, which is a critical assumption of the signal jamming models. The capital market in Stein (1989) anticipates the manager to in ‡ate the …rm value and the manager indeed takes such an action. In equilibrium, the capital market is not fooled and all players are trapped in this "bad"equilibrium. Should the manager's action be observable, the capital market would simply update its belief accordingly and the signal jamming would no longer hold. In our setting, signal jamming induces a potentially "good"equilibrium as it could lead the …rms to make higher investments, thus the supply chain …rms can actually bene…t from the lack of observability.
We identify conditions under which the retailer, the supplier, and the entire supply chain could be better o¤ when the capital market does not observe the …rms' investments and negotiation outcome.
Finally, we also study the case where both …rms are publicly listed. We allow the …rms to be symmetric by sharing the same levels of bargaining power, importance in the collaboration, and market concerns. Similar to the case with one public …rm and one private …rm, the market concerns in ‡uence the …rms' investments, the shares of joint surplus received, and the payo¤s. We show that a certain degree of market concerns is bene…cial for the …rms themselves as well as for the whole supply chain.
Our paper is closely connected to the well established literature on hold-up problems, including Grossman and Hart (1986) , Hart (1995) , Hart and Moore (1999) , and Segal and Whinston (2012), among others. This literature takes the perspective of the welfare of the whole partnership and studies how a potential hold-up between individual parties can result in the undersupply of relation-speci…c investments and ine¢ ciencies for the all parties involved. This idea has been widely applied to a variety of di¤erent inter-and intra-…rm coordination problems. Of particular interest thereby is how di¤erent agreements exacerbate or mitigate the hold-up problem between the parties (e.g., Edlin and Reichelstein 1995, 1996 shows how the market concerns of a publicly-listed …rm a¤ect the investments of the parties, the distribution of the joint surplus, and the performance of the individual parties and the whole supply chain.
Our paper is also closely related to the signal jamming literature, including Holmstrom (1983), Gibbons (1985) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) , Stein (1989) among others. Signal jamming is a type of model that results in an equilibrium in which the sender of information always manipulates while the receiver of information always anticipates the manipulation. Holmstrom (1983) shows that career concerns at the labor market provide incentives for an employee to overexert e¤ort in the early stage of his career, in order to raise the labor market's assessment of his ability. Stein (1989) describes a scenario where managers with myopic preference for a higher stock price engage in nonproductive actions/investments to manipulate market expectation. Signal jamming models are also applied in accounting research. A review provided by Kanodia and Sapra (2016) highlights how di¤erent accounting treatments of performance measures interact with the …rm's investment decisions in the presence of capital market concerns. Liang and Wen (2007) show …rms may over-or underinvest depending on how the accounting system measures the …rms' cash ‡ows and investments. Kanodia, Singh, and Spero (2005) show that some imprecision in measuring a …rm's investment can be bene…cial when the pro…tability of the investment cannot be directly communicated to the capital market. Dutta and Nezlobin (2019) show that risk-averse shareholders can bene…t from the non-disclosure of the …rm's investment decision.
Finally, our paper is especially similar in spirit to studies that examine the impact of a …rm's market concerns within a supply chain. Lai, Debo, and Nan (2011) examine how a myopic manager of a retailer may use channel stu¢ ng to mislead the market valuation.
The manager reports a sales level that is higher than the actual demand by pushing leftover inventory to downstream …rms. Based on the signaling framework, Lai, Xiao, and Yang (2012), Schmidt, Gaur, Lai, and Raman (2015), and Lai and Xiao (2018) examine the e¤ect of inventory stocking decisions in a newsvendor model to signal a …rm's private information about its expected consumer demand to the capital market.
Our analysis contributes to the prior literature by showing that public …rms'concerns for stock market performance could have a positive e¤ect in a supply chain setting. In particular, when the investment made by the …rm with market concerns are su¢ ciently important for the collaboration, the market concerns help mitigating the hold-up problem and the ine¢ ciency associated with it. By taking this approach, we also add to the limited prior studies that investigate the impact of the capital market on supply chain management. Many …rms active in supply chains are publicly-traded and care about their stock market performances.
However, the majority of supply chain research focuses on the …rms'operational e¢ ciency, while remaining silent on the importance of capital market concerns in the …rms'operational decisions. Our paper demonstrates one such scenario and how the market concerns could a¤ect not only the focal …rm but also the whole supply chain. Finally, our analysis can be recast in terms of a strategic alliance or a joint venture between two …rms. As long as bilateral investments are needed and market concerns are present, the insights from our results would hold true.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the baseline model that is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 analysis the case that the capital market has perfect information about the …rms'decisions. Section 5 analysis the case that both …rms are listed. Section 6 concludes the paper. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Setup
We consider a retailer (R) and a supplier (S) who form a supply chain, with the supplier providing input for the retailer who then sells the product to the …nal consumer market. The supplier is privately owned while the retailer is publicly traded. The key di¤erence between the two …rms is that the retailer cares not just only about the its long-term cash ‡ows, but also about short-term stock price.
While our analysis focuses on the business related to the supply chain collaboration, both …rms also independently generate pro…ts from their own regular business in each of the two periods. We denote these net pro…ts as e 1R , e 2R , e 1S , e 2S , with all of them normally distributed with means R and S , and variances 2 R and 2 S . The pro…ts from the two di¤erent periods are correlated, with Cov[e 1R ; e 2R ] = R and Cov[e 1S ; e 2S ] = S , and R and S are both positive. This implies that when the …rst-period pro…t is high, the second-period pro…t is also likely to be high. 3 All other random variables are uncorrelated.
Time line
In the beginning of period 1, the retailer and the supplier each undertake a relation-speci…c investment at date 1, I R and I S respectively, to facilitate the supply chain collaboration.
As standard in the hold-up literature, the …rms'speci…c investments are unobservable and unveri…able to outsiders. This is because many supply chain investments involve activities such as market research and technical development, which are inseparable from the …rms' regular businesses and di¢ cult to measure and report. To make these investments, the retailer incurs a cost of w R (I R ) = I R and the supplier incurs a cost of w S (I S ) = I S . 4 The 3 Alternatively, we could let the supply chain business generate a stream of cash ‡ows that are inter-temporally correlated. The …rms' investments could serve to enhance these cash ‡ows, on which the …nancial market forms a price based on its expectations. This alternative scenario would lead to the same qualitative results as the current setting. 4 It is a standard assumption in both the hold-up literature and the signal jamming literature to have unobservable investments and the associated costs. Our insights remain valid when the costs are observable but with uncorrelated noise, i.e., w R (I R ) = I R + R with R N (0; 2 R ) and (1)
In line with the hold-up literature, the investment costs are sunk at that time and are not re ‡ected in the date-3 cash ‡ow. All pro…ts generated during the …rst period are distributed back to the shareholders. Meanwhile, the stock market updates its information about the retailer and gives a price p R .
At period 2, the …rms are both liquidated and their liquidation values are simply the cash ‡ows realized, i.e., e x 2R = e 2R and e x 2S = e 2S .
this point see Kanodia and Sapra 2016) . Section 4 investigates the case that the capital market has perfect information about the investments. 
Market price and payo¤s
The interim market price for the listed retailer, p R , at date 3 re ‡ects the market's expectation of the retailer's future cash ‡ow in period 2, given the market's information Y m in period 1.
That is,
The market's information set is given by Y m = fx 1R ; b I; b g where "^"denotes the conjectured values of the market. That is, the market observes the period-1 cash ‡ow of the listed retailer and makes conjectures about the investments and the share of the surplus that the retailer receives. In the case where the two …rms do not trade the retailer does not receive any surplus, the market simply conjectures b = 0. 5
The Bayes'theorem for normally distributed random variables implies that p R is determined as the unconditional mean of the period-2 cash ‡ow plus the realized period-1 cash ‡ow less the conjectured mean for the period-1 cash ‡ow weighted with the familiar covariance-
> 0. That is, the market price equals
The realized cash ‡ow, x 1R ( ; I), re ‡ects the decisions undertaken by the two …rms, whereas
, re ‡ects the market's conjectures regarding those decisions. If the cash ‡ows of the two periods are uncorrelated, then the market price does not put any weight on the period-1 cash ‡ow and equals the expected period-2 cash ‡ow. With increasing correlation, the period-1 cash ‡ow entails more information about the period-2 cash ‡ow and the market price puts more weight on the period-1 cash ‡ow.
(1), the expected market price equals
which increases in the retailer's surplus, M (I). The retailer thus has an incentive to increase the market price by 1) undertaking high investments and 2) negotiating more aggressively in order to obtain a higher share of the surplus. In equilibrium, however, the market anticipates this behavior and adjusts its conjectures correctly.
Recall that the retailer is motivated by both the …rm's interim market price and long-term cash ‡ow, weighted with R 2 [0; 1] and (1 R ), respectively. A common interpretation is that due to life cycle or liquidity reasons a portion R of the …rm may be sold at the capital market before the …rm is liquidated and the remaining (1 R ) portion will be held by the initial shareholders. The parameter, R , re ‡ects the preferences of the shareholders and is exogenously given and not a choice variable. 6 In particular, the retailer's expected 6 Kanodia and Sapra (2016) provide a more detailed discussion about why short-term incentives arise exogenously. Some other papers treat short-term incentives as an endogenous variable that can be optimized by a judiciously chosen performance-based contract. Since our paper abstract away contracting and incentive issues, we only examine whether a certain level of is more bene…cial for the …rms.
is the weighted average of the long-term period-2 cash ‡ow and the expected interim market price from (4), and E[e x 1R ] w 1R is the retailer's net payo¤ for period 1. Accounting for (1) and the expected market price in (4), the retailer's expected total payo¤ (5) can be restated as follows:
Absent the retailer's short-term market concerns, the retailer's expected payo¤ equals the sum of the expected net cash ‡ows.
The supplier is privately-owned and does not face pressure from the capital market. Given
(1), the supplier's expected total payo¤, E[U S ], is the sum of the expected net cash ‡ows of the two periods, i.e.,
3 Analysis
In this section, we examine the impact of the retailer's market concerns on the decisions of both …rms, as well as the implications for the whole supply chain. We are interested in how the market concerns a¤ect the investment levels and the shares of surplus that …rms obtain through the negotiation, and additionally, whether the retailer's market concerns are bene…cial or detrimental for the …rms and for the whole supply chain.
Bargaining and investments
We examine the …rms' decisions using backward induction. At date 2, the retailer and supplier negotiate about the share that each …rm receives from the joint surplus that the supply chain generates. At this date, the investments have already been made and the investment costs of both …rms are sunk. When trade between the two …rms takes place, the retailer's expected total payo¤ equals
from (6). If the …rms do not trade, the retailer's expected total payo¤ equals
The retailer's expected net payo¤ from the collaboration equals
and depends on the (conjectured) total trading surplus, the (conjectured) share received, and the degree of its market concerns. The supplier's expected net payo¤ from the collaboration equals the amount of supply chain surplus that it receives, i.e., (1 ) M (I) from (7).
The two …rms then proceed to negotiate about the shares of surplus that each …rm receives from the trade, à la generalized Nash bargaining, i.e.,
where b 2 [0; 1] re ‡ects the retailer's bargaining power and (1 b) re ‡ects the supplier's bargaining power. The retailer's bargaining power vis-à-vis the supplier depend on exogenous factors such as its …rm size, its market power in the …nal product market, and how easy it is to switch to a di¤erent supplier. If not stated otherwise, we assume b 2 (0; 1) to rule out corner solutions. 7 Solving the bargaining problem in (10) shows that the retailer receives a share of surplus
Absent market concerns, the retailer's share of surplus equals its bargaining power, i.e., = b
if R = 0. This result is a standard …nding in the hold-up literature. In the presence of market concerns, the retailer bargains more aggressively and obtains an additional markup. Intuitively, the retailer's market concerns scale its net bene…t from trade to
in the negotiation process, as shown in (10), while the supplier's interest remains at the same level at (1 )M (I). Consequently, the increase of the retailer's stake in the collaboration above its bargaining power results in it bargaining more aggressively.
The capital market anticipates the power dynamics between the two …rms and conjectures correctly that b I = I and b = . Lemma 1 establishes the retailer's equilibrium share of surplus.
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the retailer's share of the trading surplus is
Lemma 1 shows that the presence of the retailer's market concerns amplify the retailer's bargaining power and help it obtain a higher share of surplus during the negotiation. In particular, Lemma 1 implies that the retailer's share of surplus equals its bargaining power if the retailer has (1) zero bargaining power, (2) full bargaining power, or (3) no market concerns, i.e., = b if b 2 f0; 1g or R = 0. Otherwise, the retailer's share increases in its 7 We do not explicitly examine the trading quantity in this model since under a two part tari¤ the …rms would always agree to set the quantity at the …rst-best level. degree of market concerns, i.e.,
Next, we examine the …rms'investment decisions. Each …rm chooses an investment level that maximizes its total payo¤, anticipating the equilibrium from Lemma 1. Their objective functions are as follows.
The retailer's and supplier's investment decision are given by the …rst-order conditions: The …rms' equilbrium investments depend on the relative importance of these investments, the bargaining power of the individual …rms, and the retailer's degree of market concerns. As outlined in Lemma 1, the retailer's market concerns make it a more aggressive bargainer while negotiating with the supplier about the division of the supply chain surplus.
One might thus conjecture that the retailer's investment would increase in its market concerns, whereas the supplier's investment decreases. Our analysis shows that this conjecture is only true when the complementarity between the two investments is low. When the complementarity between the two investments is high, a spillover e¤ect is generated between the two investments. As a result, both investments increase in R if the retailer's investment is important, and both investments decrease in R if the supplier's investment is important.
Intuitively, if the retailer's investment is su¢ ciently important and the retailer invests more, the increase in the supplier's marginal bene…t from the increased trading surplus o¤sets the lower share of surplus the supplier receives. Similarly, if the supplier's investment is su¢ciently important and the supplier invests less, the retailer's marginal bene…t decreases so severely that even a higher share of surplus cannot o¤set the e¤ect.
For the sake of convenience, we state the marginal investments in terms of the retailer's share and the investments from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1, i.e.,
Equation (16) con…rms our intuition that we summarize in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 (i) The investments of the retailer and the supplier both increase in the retailer's market concerns when the impact of the retailer's investment is su¢ ciently high and the impact of the supplier's investment is su¢ ciently low, i.e., @I R @ R 0 i¤ s 1 2 and @I S @ R 0 i¤ r 2 :
(ii) The retailer's investments increase and the supplier's investments decrease in the retailer's market concerns when the impact of the retailer's investment and of the supplier's investment are both su¢ ciently low, i.e., @I R @ R 0 i¤ s 1 2 and @I S @ R 0 i¤ r 2 :
(iii) Otherwise the retailer's and the supplier's investments both decrease in the retailer's market concerns, i.e., @I R @ R 0 i¤ s 1 2 and @I S @ R 0 i¤ r 2 :
Corollary 1 shows that the retailer's market concerns can lead to higher or lower …rm investments, depending on the relative importance of the two …rms' inputs in the joint production process. Figure 2 illustrates the three cases outlined in Corollary 1 by numerically illustrating the impact of the retailer's market concerns on the …rms'investment decisions. 
The impact of market concerns on the retailer
In this section, we examine how the retailer's market concerns a¤ect its …rm value. The retailer's expected total payo¤ from (6) is
where the expectation is taken ex ante before the investments are made. The retailer's market concerns a¤ect V R through its e¤ects on the investments of both …rms and the retailer's share of the joint surplus. The marginal …rm value re ‡ects the impact of these three forces and equals:
The …rst term captures the e¤ect of the retailer's market concerns on its …rm value via its investment. As the retailer with market concerns overinvests to manage market expectations, this term has a negative sign when the retailer's investment increases in R . This insight is consistent with Stein (1989) that myopic behavior induces value destroying investment incentives. While the e¤ect of market concerns in Stein (1989) is always one sided, in our model the retailer's investment could increase or decrease in R . That is, the …rst term of equation (17) is negative if @I R @ R 0 (and vice versa). The second term shows that higher market concerns results in higher share of the supply chain surplus for the retailer, which has a positive e¤ect on the …rm value, i.e., @ @ R M 0. The last term re ‡ects the e¤ect of the retailer's market concerns on the …rm value via the supplier's investments. This term has either a positive or a negative value depending on whether the supplier's investment increase or decrease in R , i.e., @M @I S @I S @ R 0 if @I S @ R 0 (and vice versa).
We provide further insights by restating the marginal …rm value (17) in two steps. In a …rst step, we exploit the familiar relation for the Cobb-Douglas pro…t margin, @M @I R = rM I R and @M @I S = sM I S . In a second step, we substitute the retailer's share of surplus from Lemma 1 and the marginal investments from (16) . That is,
with the coe¢ cients, k 0 = (1 b)(1 r) s(1 2r), k 1 = (2r(1 bs s) b(r s)) R < 0, and k 2 = r(2s 1)b 2 R . The sign of (18) is determined by the sign of the quadratic function,
The proof of Proposition 2 will show that the retailer's …rm value decreases in its market concerns when the intercept of the quadratic function has a positive value, i.e., dV R d R < 0 if k 0 < 0. That is, in line with prior results, the retailer's market concern is detrimental for it.
If k 0 > 0, then the retailer's market concern can be bene…cial for it. The retailer's …rm value increases in its market concerns for R R and decreases in the retailer's market concerns for R R , where R is the unique level that maximizes the …rm value. The sign of k 0 can be expressed in terms of the importance of the retailer's and supplier's investment.
Proposition 2 summarizes our …nding. . Figure 3 . Impact of retailer' s market concerns on its …rm value. Parameters are (r; s; b; R ) = ( 6 10 ; 3 10 ; 1 2 ; 1 2 ); ( 1 10 ; 1 10 ; 1 2 ; 1 2 ); ( 1 10 ; 8 10 ; 1 2 ; 1 2 ) for Panels A, B, C. 
One-sided investment
To provide further insights into how our supply chain model is related to the single-…rm case, we consider the special case that only the retailer's investment is necessary for the joint supply chain collaboration, i.e., s = 0. 8 In this case, the retailer's investment equals
1 r and unambiguously increases in R . The retailer's market concerns have a negative impact on its …rm value due to overinvestment, but has a positive impact as the retailer receives a higher share of surplus. The marginal …rm value captures these two forces as follows:
The positive impact dominates for R = 0. The level of market concerns that maximizes 8 For the discussion that follows, we apply Lemma 1, Propositions 1 and 2 for s = 0.
the retailer's …rm value is
The retailer's market value decreases in its bargaining power as the positive impact of R on the its share of surplus diminishes in b, i.e., @ R @b < 0. If the retailer is the residual claimant of the supply chain surplus, then the positive impact of R on the retailer's share goes down to zero. In this case, consistent with the single …rm scenario in Stein (1989) , the market concerns are unambiguously detrimental for the retailer as it induces ine¢ cient investments, i.e., (20) implies R = 0 for b = 1.
The impact of market concerns on the whole supply chain
From the perspective of the integrated system (i.e., the whole supply chain), a hold-up problem arises when each …rm has to bear the full cost of the investment, but does not receive its full bene…ts. Corollary 1 shows that the myopic market concerns of the retailer can increase or reduce the investments of the …rms. When the retailer's investment is more important than the supplier's investment for the collaboration, its market concerns can mitigate the hold-up problem and increase supply chain e¢ ciency. When the supplier's investment is more important than the retailer's investment, the retailer's market concerns would instead exacerbate the hold-up problem and further reduce the supply chain e¢ ciency.
To elaborate, the value of the whole supply chain equals the expected ex ante total
, and the resulting …rst-best investments, I = (I R ; I S ), maximize the value of the whole supply chain and satisfy the following standard …rst-order conditions:
That is, the marginal bene…ts from the investments equal the marginal investment costs.
Without the retailer's market concerns, the …rst-order conditions of the …rms'investment decisions in (15) show that a standard hold-up problem arises as each …rm receives only a fraction of the marginal bene…ts from its investments. The …rms thus invest below the e¢ cient level from the perspective of the whole supply chain. Corollary 1 (i) shows that the retailer's market concerns can increase the investments of both …rms. The associated …rst-order conditions (15) imply that the …rst-best investments, I , can only be induced if each …rm receives hundred percent of the marginal bene…ts from its investments, i.e., if
The two equations cannot be satis…ed simultaneously and total supply chain e¢ ciency cannot be induced by R alone. Corollary 2 summarizes our result.
Corollary 2 In case of bilateral investments, it is impossible that retailer and supplier both invest e¢ ciently from the perspective of the whole supply chain.
To explore this issue in more detail, we consider the impact of the retailer's market concerns on the marginal value of the whole supply chain in two steps. In the …rst step, we account for the investment decisions of the two …rms in (15) . In the second step, we exploit the familiar relation for the Cobb-Douglas pro…t margin, @M @I R = rM I R and @M @I S = sM I S , and account for the retailer's share in Lemma 1 and the marginal investments from (16) .
That is, That is,
Proposition 3 shows that depending on the importance of the retailer's and supplier's investment the retailer's market concerns can increase or reduce the value of the whole supply chain. Figure 4 provides a numerical illustration for the same parameters that are used in Figures 2 and 3 . 
One-sided investment
In the special case of one-sided investment by the retailer only, supply chain e¢ ciency can be fully restored through the retailer's market concerns. In this case, the marginal value from (22) reduces to:
When the e¤ect of market concerns on the retailer's investment exactly o¤sets the share of surplus that the supplier receives, i.e., if T R R = (1 ) is satis…ed, the result is equivalent to the retailer receiving 100% of the supply chain surplus. Hence, the retailer is e¤ectively fully motivated to invest e¢ ciently for the supply chain, and the level of market concerns that maximizes the supply chain value is
The impact of market concerns on the supplier
The retailer's market concern also a¤ects the privately owned supplier. On one hand, the supplier is disadvantaged because the retailer becomes an aggressive bargainer, which reduces the supplier's share of surplus in the negotiation. On the other hand, the supplier also bene…ts from the retailer's market concerns as they may increase the retailer's investment in the supply chain. The supplier's investment itself does not play a role, as the supplier invests e¢ ciently from its own perspective. Applying the Envelope Theorem, we show that the supplier's expected marginal payo¤ re ‡ects these two forces:
Since @M @I R = rM I R , Equation (25) can be restated as:
The supplier only bene…ts from the retailer's market concerns if the retailer's investment has a su¢ ciently large impact on the collaboration, i.e., if r > b 2 . In this case, the supplier's expected payo¤ increases in the retailer's market concerns when R S R and decreases when R S R , with the level of retailer market concerns maximizing the supplier payo¤ being S R = 2r b
Observability
In a signal jamming model, the sender is trapped in a bad equilibrium as she has to choose a distorted action. The sender would have been better o¤ if she could commit to not distort her action or if her action can be observed by the receiver. In Stein (1989) , if the capital market could perfectly observe the investments, the …rm may no longer have incentives to manipulate the stock price. In this section, we discuss the implications in our model when the capital market has perfect information about the retailer's and supplier's investments and the retailer's share.
In this case of symmetric information, the market's information set is given by The retailer's share of surplus equals its bargaining power and both …rms invest e¢ ciently from their own perspectives. This is equivalent to the case that R = 0 with the associated payo¤s for the retailer, the whole supply chain, and the supplier, V R (0); V T (0) and V S (0). (26) provide conditions under which it is bene…cal when the capital market does not observe the …rms'decisions for the retailer, the whole supply chain, and the supplier, respectively. The interpretations follow directly from these results.
Propositions 2, 3, and equation
Proposition 4 It can be bene…cial for the supplier, the retailer, and the whole supply chain bene…t when the capital market does not observe the …rms'decisions.
Both …rms are publicly listed
In this section, we discuss the case where both …rms are publicly listed. For simplicity, we let the two …rms be symmetric with the same bargaining power and same importance of investments, i.e., b = 1 2 ; M (I) = I r R I r S with 0 r < 1 2 , 2 i = 2 and i = for i = R; S. Having removed the mechanism that leads to di¤erences in investment levels, we show that the investments of both …rms increase in their market concerns. As a result, the market concerns can increase the value for both …rms as well as the value of the whole supply chain.
We denote with i the share of surplus that …rm i receives and slightly extend the de…nition of the …rm's cash ‡ow by introducing an additional noise term that re ‡ects correlation between the pro…t margin at period 1 and 2, i.e., e x 1i ( i ; I) = e 1i + i M (I) + e 1 and e x 2i = e 2i + e 2 with e t N (0; 2 ) and Cov[ e 1 ; e 2 ] = 0 for i = R; S and t = 1; 2. 9
The market price for …rm i re ‡ects the market's expectation of …rm i's future cash ‡ows,
The capital market prices …rm i by using the period-1 cash ‡ows of both …rms to update its belief:
where we denote the conjectured values as b Accounting for the market price (27), …rm i's objective function equals
The two …rms then bargain over their shares for the joint surplus, i.e.,
In equilibrium, the conjectures of the market are correct and …rm i's share of surplus equals:
Equation (30) extends our prior …nding in Lemma 1. In particular, …rm i's share of surplus increases in the degree of its own market concerns, i , and decreases in the degree of …rm j's market concerns, j . If the …rms have the same degree of market concerns, then each …rm receives half of the surplus. Firm i's share of surplus also increases in the weight that the market assigns to the cash ‡ow if its degree of market concerns exceeds the degree of market concerns of the other …rm (and vice versa), i.e., sgn
Anticipating the bargaining outcome, each …rm determines its investment to maximize its expected payo¤ in (28), implying the following …rst-order condition:
That is, the marginal investment costs equal the marginal bene…ts accounting for the market e¤ect. For i = 0, the marginal bene…t of the investment equals …rm i's share of the supply chain marginal pro…t. The additional term, i [ i j ] @M (I) @I i , re ‡ects …rm i's incentives to in ‡ate its market price by adjusting its investment. Firm i's incentives increase in its share and in the weight that the market assigns to its cash ‡ow, , and decreases in …rm j's share and the weight that the market assigns to …rm j's cash ‡ow, . In equilibrium, the market's conjectures are correct and …rm i's investments are given by:
Next, we examine the marginal impact of myopic market concerns on the …rm value, i.e., Proposition 5 summarizes the result.
Proposition 5 For the case of symmetric …rms, there is a unique positive level of myopic market concerns that maximizes the …rm value of i, i.e., i = min
Finally, we consider the whole supply chain and the associated value equals: V T ( ) = 2 R + 2 S + M (I( )) w i (I i ( )) w j (I j ( )). Accounting for …rm i's investment decision in (32) and the resulting equilibrium value, i = 1 2 , the expected marginal payo¤ equals
and can be interpreted in line with (22) . Equation (33) implies that the value of the whole supply chain increases in i and is maximized for i = j = 1. First-best supply chain e¢ ciency, however, is not achievable as this requires i = j = 1 > 1:
Corollary 3 For the case of symmetric …rms, the value of the whole supply chain increases in the myopic market concerns. First-best supply chain e¢ ciency cannot be achieved.
Conclusion
We investigate the impact of a publicly-traded …rm's myopic market concerns on the investment decisions of itself and its privately-owned supply chain partner. While the market concerns help the public …rm in obtaining a higher share of the joint supply chain surplus through bargaining, its e¤ect on the total size of the joint surplus can be positive or negative. When the public …rm's investment is su¢ ciently more important than the private …rm's investment, market concerns lead to higher investments and thus higher joint surplus.
When the private …rm's investment is more important, the opposite is true. Accordingly, a …rm's myopic market concerns can be bene…cial or detrimental for itself as well as the whole supply chain.
Our results have interesting practical implications. While conventional wisdom may predict that supply chain partners'concerns for their stock prices can mitigate hold-up problems and brings forth e¢ ciency improvement, we show this is not always the case. If the …rm with the market concerns is responsible for making the critical contribution for the supply chain performance, all incentives are aligned and Pareto improvements can be achieved. However, if the supply chain collaboration depends more heavily on the private …rm, the aggressive bargaining of the publicly-traded partner disincentivizes its private partner …rm and results in decreased investments from both sides.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 We consider the bargaining problem in (10) . For simplicity, we abbreviate the conjectured pro…t margin M ( b I) as c M . The …rst-order condition with respect to
which implies (11) . The second-order condition is given by
In equilibrium, the conjectures are always correct, thus b = and c M = M . We obtain the equilibrium value from Lemma 1, and the second-order condition (A2) is ful…lled with
Proof of Proposition 1 follows from solving the …rst-order conditions in (15) . For i = R; S, the associated second-order condition is satis…ed as @ 2 M @ 2 I i < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1 Given the investments from Proposition 1, the marginal investments of the retailer and the supplier are Proof of Proposition 2 We use @M @I R = rM I R and @M @I S = sM I S , Equation (13), and Lemma 1 to restate the marginal value from (17) as
(A6) with k 0 = (1 b)(1 r) s(1 2r), k 1 = (2r(1 bs s) b(r s)) R < 0, and k 2 = r(2s 1)b 2 R . (i) Assume a positive intercept, k 0 > 0, and denote the two potential zeros of the quadratic
. Three cases emerge: (a) If the quadratic function has a u-shape, k 2 > 0, then the function has a negative value of k 0 k 2 1 4k 2 < 0 at the vertex, k 1 2k 2 > 0. This implies that the quadratic function has two di¤erent zeros, i.e., p k 2 1 4k 0 k 2 > 0. Since the quadratic function decreases at the intercept, . For the sake of convenience, we summarize the optimal value in terms of the coe¢ cients of the quadratic function as follows:
(ii) Assume a negative intercept, k 0 < 0, then three cases emerge: (a) If the quadratic function collapses to a linear function, k 2 = 0, then k 0 + k 1 R 0 for all R since k 1 0.
(b) If the quadratic function has an inverted u-shape, k 2 < 0, then the quadratic function has a negative value at R = 0 and decreases as
the quadratic function has a u-shape, k 2 > 0, then the quadratic function has a negative value at R = 0 and increases for larger R . We show that the function has a negative value at R = 1 by noting that k 2 0 implies s .
is linear in r and is maximized at the boundary values r = f0; 1 2 g. 11 For r = 0, we get
Proof of Corollary 2 follows as outlined in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3
We use @M @I R = r M I R and @M @I S = s M I S , Equation (13), and Lemma 1 10 Please note that the sign of k 2 alters the ordering of the zeros, z 1 and z 2 . 11 Formally, we can recast the quadratic function in terms of z R = R R and determine the zero z R and
to obtain and (b z 1 ; 1) and has a negative value at crit 1 , i.e., P ( crit 1 ) < 0. Since crit
is positive (note that c 2 < 0), we get T R = b z 2 . 12 (c) For c 3 = 0, the cubic function collapses to an inverse u-shaped quadratic function with a positive intercept and two zeros, e z 1 > e z 2 , implying that T R = e z 1 . 13 12 Please note that the sign of c 3 determines the ordering of the critical values, crit 1=2 . 13 Note that the quadratic function cannot reduce to a linear function as c 0 > 0 implies c 2 < 0. 0 and r 0. We use these slightly di¤erent conditions for technical reasons. Further c 0 < 0 implies c 1 < 0. Derivation of Equation (25) Knowing (15), @M @I R = rM I R , (13) and Lemma 1, we show that, for V S = (1 ( R ))M (I( R )) w S (I S ( R )),
is linear in R , implying S R as outlined in the text.
Proof of Proposition 4 Applying Propositions 2 and 3, and Equation (25) proves the result.
Proof of Proposition 5
We consider the bargaining problem in (29). The …rst-order condition with respect to R , gives us Exploiting @M @I i = rM I i , the marginal value can be restated as:
Using (30) and (32), we show that the marginal value is a rational function with a degree of four.
Under symmetry of i = j ; (A15) reduces to
with coe¢ cients d 0 = (1 3r)( + ) + 4r 2 , d 1 = ((1 4r) + )((1 2r) ), and d 2 = ((3 4r) )r( 2 2 ). Note, d 2 0 must be true since d 2 0 would imply r 3 4 > 3 4 = 1 2 , contradicting r < 1 2 . Also, d 0 0 is true as for r > 1 3 we get d 0 > (1 3r)2 + 4r 2 since > . Further, (2 6r) + 4r 2 > 0 holds true for r < 1 2 . Finally, d 0 ; d 2 0 implies i =
Proof of Corollary 3
We determine the marginal value of the supply chain through the …rst-order conditions (31), and obtain
which implies @V T @ i 0 for i 1 . First-best would require i = 1 > 1.
